

No. 16-1161

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

BEVERLY R. GILL, ET AL.,

Appellants,

v.

WILLIAM WHITFORD, ET AL.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin

**BRIEF OF SENATORS JOHN McCAIN AND
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE IN SUPPORT
OF APPELLEES**

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INTEREST OF *AMICI CURIAE*

Amici are U.S. Senator John McCain of Arizona and U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island.¹

As national political leaders, *amici* have a strong interest in the proper functioning of our democracy, and are witnesses to the symptoms and ill effects of its distress. As active, democratically elected legislators of both major political parties, *amici* are deeply concerned about the damage excessive partisan redistricting inflicts on the American democratic process.

Amici see firsthand the concerns of constituents who increasingly view politics as a game run by powerful special interests that have changed the rules to win the game. We also see why constituents believe that. We see the age-old problem worsening of an “influencer class” that the public sees garnering disproportionate rewards at the public’s expense, and we see gerrymandering as a tool of the influencer class in that effort.

Americans do not like gerrymandering. They see its mischief, and absent a legal remedy, their sense of powerlessness and discouragement has increased, deepening the crisis of confidence in our democracy. We share this perspective. From our vantage point,

¹ Pursuant to Rule 37.6, *amici* affirm that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person other than *amici*, their members, or their counsel made any monetary contributions intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. The parties have filed letters with the Clerk consenting to the filing of all amicus briefs in this case.

we see wasted votes and silenced voices. We see hidden power. And we see a correctable problem.

Amici hope that this bipartisan report from the political front lines will aid the Court by providing pragmatic, real-world input on the ways in which partisan gerrymandering undermines our democracy. These concerns should be central to the Court’s review of whether the district court correctly held that Wisconsin’s redistricting scheme constitutes an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case implicates the effective functioning of American representative democracy. With roots tracing to Patrick Henry and Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry, politically motivated redistricting has long been a part of American politics. But what began as a tactic to protect individual incumbencies and to undercut adversaries has morphed into something much different today. Partisan gerrymandering is now accomplished by using sophisticated technology—including mapping software, census data, and voting algorithms—to redraw a state’s district lines to maximize partisan advantage across an entire state.²

This new breed of “bulk” partisan gerrymandering distorts statewide votes, systematically diluting the effect of votes based on political affiliation and leading

² See Sheldon Whitehouse, *Captured: The Corporate Infiltration of American Democracy* 83–86 (2017); Emily Bazelon, *The New Front in the Gerrymandering Wars: Democracy vs. Math*, N. Y. Times Mag. (Aug. 29, 2017).

to the election of congressional and state legislative delegations that do not represent the will of the voters. This practice violates “the core principle of republican government, namely, that the voters should choose their representatives, not the other way around.” *Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n*, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

I. A. The rise of extreme partisan gerrymandering over the past decade can be traced directly to this Court’s decision in *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). Although partisan gerrymandering existed before *Vieth*, the threat of judicial review provided a strong deterrent that kept states from adopting extremely gerrymandered districts. *Vieth*’s refusal to treat partisan gerrymandering claims as justiciable effectively removed this threat. State legislatures—and political operatives seeking to gain and entrench political power—have viewed this decision as an invitation to redraw districts to push the limit of partisan advantage. As the American Bar Association observed, “[t]he Court’s recent decisions appear to give legislators leeway to preserve partisan advantage as zealously as they like when drawing district lines.”³

B. The increase in partisan gerrymandering in recent years has been bolstered by the growing presence of “dark money” in the American political system.⁴

³ J. Gerald Hebert, Paul M. Smith, Martina E. Vandenberg, & Michael B. DeSanctis, A.B.A., *The Realist’s Guide to Redistricting: Avoiding the Legal Pitfalls* 19 (2d ed. 2010).

⁴ By “dark money,” we mean money contributed to nonprofit organizations and used for political purposes without disclosure of the donor’s identity.

Special interest groups, fueled by hidden funders with deep pockets and skin in the political game, are now focused on influencing redistricting. The payoff for these groups is obvious: By shaping the decennial redistricting process, special interest groups can affect the outcome of every Congressional race in a state for the next decade. The role of dark money in this process is a bipartisan concern, as both Republicans and Democrats rely on this funding.

C. This Court has already acknowledged “the incompatibility of severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic principles.” *Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 292. Severe partisan gerrymandering undermines our democracy, which is based on fair and open elections that accurately reflect the will of the people and count every vote equally. When the voters of a state vote one way, the resulting congressional delegation is more than 2-1 the opposite way, and the advantaged party intentionally produced that undemocratic result, it should be obvious that “one person, one vote” has been violated. This partisan gerrymandering leads voters to perceive, rightly, that their votes do not matter. Indeed, we have seen firsthand the growing concerns of constituents who view politics as a game orchestrated by powerful special interests whose victories come at the expense of the American voter.

II. The Court should affirm the district court’s decision. The district court’s test provides a workable framework for distinguishing between district maps drawn based on legitimate political considerations and those constituting unlawful partisan gerrymandering. That test is more than sufficient to find an unconstitutional gerrymander on the facts of this

case. The Court need not go beyond these facts and attempt to create a comprehensive test that can resolve all potential partisan gerrymandering challenges. Beyond remedying the constitutional violations present in this case, affirming the district court’s decision will send a clear message that partisan gerrymandering will not be tolerated.

ARGUMENT

I. Partisan Gerrymandering Has Become A Tool For Powerful Interests To Distort The Democratic Process.

Democracy is not abstract or academic. It is a battleground on which competing interests exert all the pressure they can muster. This battleground often pits special interest groups against a general population that wants only to be treated fairly.⁵

Special interest groups have long influenced the outcome of elections. But this Court’s decision in *Viet* made redistricting a particularly attractive tool for

⁵ This is a long-observed conflict, reflected in the pages of history from Niccolo Machiavelli’s writings to President Jackson’s bank veto message. See, e.g., Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ch. IX (1513) (speaking of “two distinct parties” in a governed society: one, “the nobles [who] wish to rule and oppress the people,” and two, “the people [who] do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles”); Andrew Jackson, *Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States* (July 10, 1832), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp (distinguishing between “the rich and powerful [who] too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes” and the “humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves”).

these groups. No longer concerned about the prospect of judicial review, state legislatures now push gerrymandering to its limits, and special interests, supported by dark money, help them do so. The result has greatly undermined the public's faith in our democracy.

A. *Vieth* Opened The Door To Extreme Partisan Gerrymandering.

Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in *Vieth*, predicted that “if courts refuse to entertain any claims of partisan gerrymandering, the temptation to use partisan favoritism in districting in an unconstitutional manner will grow.” 541 U.S. at 312. That prediction has come true. The frequency and egregiousness of partisan gerrymandering has intensified in the decade since *Vieth*, and absent this court's intervention, the problem is only likely to worsen. Without the threat of judicial review, political parties have every incentive to engage in extreme partisan gerrymandering.

Vieth sent a clear signal that the Court was no longer inclined to intervene in partisan gerrymandering cases.⁶ *Vieth*'s impact has been felt since 2010—the first round of redistricting after the decision—as state governments sought to redraw electoral maps for partisan advantage more aggressively than ever

⁶ Anthony J. McGann, et al., *Gerrymandering in America: The House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, and the Future of Popular Sovereignty* 5 (2016) (“[A]fter *Vieth v. Jubelirer* (2004), state legislatures were willing to district for partisan advantage far more than they had previously.”).

before.⁷ Observers have recognized that “[t]he world changed with the 2010 redistricting. States were no longer constrained by the threat of judicial challenge of partisan gerrymanders, and where one party completely controlled the redistricting process, it often took full advantage.”⁸

The redistricting plan in this case provides a good example of post-*Vieth* partisan gerrymandering. The Wisconsin plan ensured that “Republicans would maintain a majority *under any likely voting scenario*; indeed, they would maintain a 54 seat majority while garnering only 48% of the statewide vote. The Democrats, by contrast, would need 54% of the statewide vote to capture a majority.” Jurisdictional Statement App. 27a (emphasis added). The plan produced precisely this lopsided result in the 2012 election that followed, in which Republicans won 60 of 99 General Assembly seats despite receiving only 48.6% of the statewide vote. *Id.* at 30a.

Congressional seats have also been subject to more extreme partisan gerrymandering since *Vieth*. In 2012, Republicans gained a 33-seat advantage in the House, despite receiving more than one million fewer votes than Democrats.⁹ Most of this advantage can be attributed to Republicans successfully tilting

⁷ *Id.* at 3.

⁸ *Id.* at 17.

⁹ Stephen Ohlemacher, *GOP Gerrymandering Creates Uphill Fight for Dems in the House*, PBS NewsHour (Mar. 31, 2014), <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/gop-gerrymandering-creates-uphill-fight-dems-house/>.

the electoral maps in key swing states. In Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan—states carried by President Obama in 2008 and 2012—Republicans hold 34 out of 48 congressional seats in the wake of the 2010 redistricting process.¹⁰

Pennsylvania provides a good example of *Vieth*'s effects. Following the 1990 Census, Pennsylvania's congressional districts were relatively compact with few oddly shaped districts, and had little or no partisan bias.¹¹ After the 2000 Census, the redistricting plan had a few more oddly shaped districts and indications of partisan bias, but the plan was approved by the district court and affirmed by the Court in *Vieth*.¹²

After the 2010 Census, Pennsylvania's districting plan changed dramatically, pushing partisan gerrymandering to its limits. The previously compact districts were largely replaced by districts that are "either elongated or have tendrils that cut into the surrounding districts."¹³ From the Republicans' perspective, these changes worked: In the 2012 House elections, Democrats received more votes than Republicans, but the state sent thirteen Republicans and only five Democrats to Congress.¹⁴

¹⁰ See Members of the U.S. Congress, 115th Congress, <https://www.congress.gov/members?q={%22congress%22:%22115%22,%22chamber%22:%22House%22}>.

¹¹ McGann, *supra* note 6, at 9.

¹² *Id.* at 11.

¹³ *Id.* at 13.

¹⁴ Nathan S. Catanese, Note, *Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous Impact of Partisan Redistricting*, 28 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 323, 329 (2014).

Scholars have concluded that this Court’s decision in *Vieth* was the primary reason for Pennsylvania’s decision to further gerrymander its congressional districts.¹⁵ When the post-2000 districts were drawn, gerrymandering for political gain could still be meaningfully challenged in the courts, which explains “why the level of partisan gerrymandering was quite modest in the post-2000 districts compared to the post-2010 ones, even though the Republicans controlled the governorship and state legislature in both cases.”¹⁶ The congressional districts adopted after *Vieth*, in contrast, “show the full potential of partisan gerrymandering when there is no threat of judicial action.”¹⁷

Republicans have certainly benefited from post-*Vieth* gerrymandering, but they are hardly alone in skewing district lines for political gain. As one commentator noted, partisan gerrymandering is “a decennial sin of every majority party.”¹⁸ Where Democrats have been in control, they have drawn gerrymandered maps just like their Republican counterparts.

¹⁵ McGann, *supra* note 6, at 3. The increase in partisan gerrymandering from the 2000 Census to the 2010 Census is clear even if one controls for a variety of other factors, including urban concentration, changes in technology, and the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. *Id.* at 4–5, 12.

¹⁶ *Id.* at 12.

¹⁷ *Id.* at 13 (“In the previous round, the Pennsylvania state government had to consider the possibility that the courts would strike down a blatantly gerrymandered districting plan. After *Vieth v. Jubelirer* (2004), this was no longer the case.”).

¹⁸ *Why Democrats are Taking Aim at Gerrymandering*, The Economist (July 12, 2017), <https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/07/economist-explains-6>.

Maryland illustrates as much. Following the 2010 Census, Democrats sought to redraw district lines to improve upon the 6-2 advantage they already enjoyed in the state's congressional delegation. Democrats took aim at Maryland's sixth district, which had elected a Republican representative for the previous two decades. Working with hired data analysts using sophisticated mapping software, Democrats successfully instituted the so-called "7-1 map," reshaping the sixth district into what one commentator compared to a "fire-breathing dragon."¹⁹ The plan shifted almost 70,000 Republicans out of the district in a nakedly partisan, and successful, effort to unseat its ten-term Republican incumbent.²⁰

Democrats have also led successful partisan redistricting efforts in Illinois. In 2010, Republicans held 11 of Illinois' 19 House seats. After Democrats redrew the district lines in 2011, they took 12 of Illinois' 18 seats in the 2012 election. Although challenged by Republicans, a federal district court, relying heavily on *Vieth*, upheld the gerrymander despite finding that it was "a blatant political move to increase the number of Democratic congressional seats." *Comm. for a Fair*

¹⁹ Dave Daley, *How Democrats Gerrymandered Their Way to Victory in Maryland*, The Atlantic (June 25, 2017), <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/how-deep-blue-maryland-shows-redistricting-is-broken/531492/>.

²⁰ As Judge Niemeyer recently observed, "[t]his 2011 shuffle accomplished the single largest redistricting swing of one party to another of any congressional district in the Nation." *Benisek v. Lamone*, 2017 WL 3642928, at *15 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2017) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).

and Balanced Map v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 835 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (N.D. Ill. 2011).²¹

In short, partisan gerrymandering has worsened significantly since *Vieth* removed the threat of judicial review. With the 2020 Census quickly approaching, the Court should curb this pernicious practice.

B. Dark Money Fuels Partisan Gerrymandering On Both Sides Of The Aisle.

As state governments become more willing to engage in partisan gerrymandering post-*Vieth*, a predictable result has occurred: Special interest groups, funded by dark money, are playing an increasingly active role in redistricting.

Drawing district lines that maximize partisan advantage is a complicated task. Legislators therefore turn to outside consultants and organizations, which offer detailed guidance on how to redraw district maps. These groups rely on sophisticated mapmaking software, census data, and partisan voting algorithms to determine how best to maximize partisan gain.²² This expertise is expensive, but special interest groups are willing to foot the bill because they recognize the potential return on their investment. Spending money to help a House candidate in an election

²¹ See also Catanese, *supra* note 14, at 331 (discussing Illinois as an example of a Democratic-controlled gerrymander).

²² See, e.g., Benisek, 2017 WL 3642928, at *19–20; Bazelon, *supra* note 2; Jane Mayer, *Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right* 411 (2016) (“The advent of computers had turned redistricting into an expensive, cynical, and highly precise science.”).

can change the occupant of that seat for the next two years. But spending to support redistricting can change every House race in the state for the next decade.

Financial support from groups accepting dark money has been crucial to recent gerrymandering efforts, and redistricting groups in most states can take unlimited amounts of money without disclosing the source. In early 2010, the Republican State Leadership Committee created the Redistricting Majority Project (“REDMAP”) with the goal of redrawing electoral maps to benefit Republican candidates.²³ In 2010, REDMAP raised more than \$30 million—much of it dark money—to elect majorities in state legislatures in battleground states including Ohio, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.²⁴ After gaining control of state legislatures, REDMAP then expanded its efforts to influence the redistricting of those states’ congressional seats.²⁵

The Republicans’ redistricting efforts were largely supported by “opaque nonprofits funded by dark money, supposedly nonpartisan campaign outfits, and

²³ See The Redistricting Majority Project, <http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/> (last visited Aug. 31, 2017) (“Republicans have an opportunity to create 20–25 new Republican Congressional Districts through the redistricting process over the next five election cycles, solidifying a Republican House Majority.”); Olga Pierce, et al., *How Dark Money Helped Republicans Hold the House and Hurt Voters*, ProPublica (Dec. 21, 2012), <https://www.propublica.org/article/how-dark-money-helped-republicans-hold-the-house-and-hurt-voters>.

²⁴ Pierce, et al., *supra* note 23.

²⁵ *Id.*

millions in corporate donations to achieve Republican-friendly maps throughout the country.”²⁶ Among the organizations funding REDMAP were groups with such seemingly neutral names as American Justice Partnership, Fair and Legal Redistricting for North Carolina, and Michigan Redistricting Resource Institute.²⁷ The neutral names disguise these organizations’ underlying partisan agendas.²⁸

The strategy behind this effort was clear, and the political intent unmistakable. In 2010, one of REDMAP’s early boosters wrote in the *Wall Street Journal* that Republicans were targeting state legislatures because “[h]e who controls redistricting can control Congress.”²⁹ REDMAP’s own 2012 Summary Report highlighted how their “strategy of targeting state legislative races in 2010 led to a Republican U.S. House

²⁶ *Id.* (“Two tobacco giants, Altria and Reynolds, each pitched in more than \$1 million to the main Republican redistricting group, as did [Karl] Rove’s super PAC, American Crossroads; Walmart and the pharmaceutical industry also contributed. Other donors, who gave to the nonprofits Republicans created, may never have to be disclosed.”).

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ See, e.g., Peter Overby, NPR News Investigations, *From Social Welfare Groups, a River of Political Influence* (Nov. 5, 2013), <http://www.npr.org/2013/11/05/242354030/from-social-welfare-groups-a-river-of-political-influence> (describing American Justice Partnership as an organization dedicated to legal reform that has “target[ed] liberal judges for defeat”).

²⁹ Karl Rove, *The GOP Targets State Legislatures*, *Wall St. J.* (Mar. 4, 2010), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703862704575099670689398044>.

Majority in 2013.”³⁰ REDMAP explained: “Drawing new district lines in states with the most redistricting activity presented the opportunity to solidify conservative policymaking at the state level and maintain a Republican stronghold in the U.S. House of Representatives for the next decade.”³¹

The Democratic Party has also supported its redistricting efforts by accepting “secretive redistricting funding.”³² For example, as noted above, Maryland Democrats gerrymandered congressional districts behind closed doors to preserve their incumbencies while taking aim at the state’s two remaining Republican seats. As former governor Martin O’Malley explained in a deposition: “Part of my intent was to create a map that, all things being legal and equal, would, nonetheless, be more likely to elect more Democrats rather than less.”³³ To that end, Democrats hired outside consultants to redraw the district lines. Those consultants later testified that their job was to “see[] if there was a way to get another Democratic district in the state.”³⁴ They succeeded, and Maryland’s two Republican seats shrunk to one.

Democrats have also relied on nonprofit organizations, funded by dark money, for support in redistricting. Like the Republican groups, these groups have

³⁰ The Redistricting Majority Project, *2012 REDMAP Summary Report* (Jan. 4, 2013), <http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/>.

³¹ *Id.*

³² Pierce, et al., *supra* note 23.

³³ Daley, *supra* note 19.

³⁴ *Id.*

nonpartisan-sounding names, such as Democracy Alliance, America Votes, and Patriot Majority USA, that belie their political agendas.³⁵ Patriot Majority USA, a 501(c)(4) social welfare group not required to publicly disclose its donors, reportedly raised \$30 million in 2014 and “was a major player in the Democrats’ failed bid to retain control of the U.S. Senate” in 2014.³⁶ Unions have reportedly donated to Patriot Majority USA,³⁷ as well as to “an array of ‘dark money’ liberal advocacy groups including the 501(c)(4) arms of the Center for American Progress, National Employment Law Project, and Partnership for Working Families—which aren’t required to report who funds them.”³⁸

As troubling as these examples are, *amici* expect that the influence of special interests groups and dark

³⁵ See, e.g., About, America Votes (last accessed Aug. 31, 2017), <https://americavotes.org/about/> (describing America Votes as “the coordination hub of the progressive community,” with “an eye on redistricting”); Richard Berman, *The Democrats’ Dark Money Hypocrisy*, The Hill (May 5, 2016), <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/278881-the-democrats-dark-money-hypocrisy>; Matea Gold, *Wealthy Donors on Left Launch New Plan to Wrest Back Control in the States*, Wash. Post (Apr. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/wealthy-donors-on-left-launch-new-plan-to-wrest-back-control-in-the-states/2015/04/12/ccd2f5ee-dfd3-11e4-a1b8-2ed88bc190d2_story.html?utm_term=.94e5ec28352c (describing Democracy Alliance as “a cadre of wealthy liberal donors”).

³⁶ Michael Beckel, *Secret Donors Fuel Democratic Political Powerhouse*, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity (Nov. 18, 2015), <https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/11/18/18875/secret-donors-fuel-democratic-political-powerhouse>.

³⁷ *Id.*

³⁸ Berman, *supra* note 35.

money in redistricting efforts will increase unless this Court steps in. One recent study found that 38 times more dark money was spent during the 2014 elections than in 2006.³⁹ And political groups are gearing up for the next round of redistricting. Democrats are already planning for a 2020 redistricting campaign, including through groups funded by “dark money,”⁴⁰ and Republicans will surely do the same.

This is just one of many ways in which dark money plagues America’s elections, but it is a significant one.

C. Partisan Gerrymandering Produces Uncompetitive And Unrepresentative Districts That Have A Corrosive Effect On Our Democracy.

“Something is rotten in the state of Denmark,” wrote Shakespeare to convey the notion of disease in the body politic. Here too, there is a powerful sense among Americans that something has gone awry.⁴¹

³⁹ Chisun Lee, et al., Brennan Ctr. for Justice, *Secret Spending in the States* 3 (June 26, 2016), <https://www.brennan-center.org/publication/secret-spending-states>.

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ These concerns are well-founded, with recent studies illustrating the high rewards (a return of nearly 1000-1 for lobbying expenditures) and high stakes (over \$700 billion per year for one subsidy) for America’s influencer class. See Bill Allison & Sarah Harkins, Sunlight Found., *Fixed Fortunes: Biggest Corporate Political Interests Spend Billions, Get Trillions* (Nov. 17, 2014), <https://sunlightfoundation.com/2014/11/17/fixed-fortunes-biggest-corporate-political-interests-spend-billions-get-trillions/>; Laurence Cockroft & Anne-Christine Wegener, *Unmasked* 14

The increase in partisan gerrymandering following *Vieth*, fueled by dark money contributions and advanced technology, distorts our representative democracy and pollutes Americans' faith in their political institutions. This Court has long recognized that "[t]he true principle of a republic is[] that the people should choose whom they please to govern them." *Powell v. McCormack*, 395 U.S. 486, 540–41 (1969) (quoting Alexander Hamilton in 2 Debates on the Federal Constitution 257 (J. Elliot ed. 1876)). The current practice of partisan gerrymandering undermines that principle. As one commentator recently observed, "[i]t used to be that the idea was, once every two years voters elected their representatives, and now, instead, it's every ten years the representatives choose their constituents."⁴²

As Republicans and Democrats battle each other to control redistricting, the real losers are the American people. Sending delegations to Congress that do not conform to the results of elections leads to disinterested and justifiably disillusioned voters. Ordinary voters may not identify the dark money forces that have separated a state delegation's makeup from that state's election results, but they surely see that some dark force is intermediating to create that anomalous

(2017) (showing a 750-1 ratio); see also <http://priceofoil.org/fossil-fuel-subsidies/>.

⁴² See Jeffrey Toobin, *Drawing the Line*, *The New Yorker*, Mar. 6, 2006, at 35 (quoting Stanford Law School Professor Pamela Karlan); see also Peter H. Shuck, *The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics*, 87 *Colum. L. Rev.* 1325, 1329 (1987) (gerrymandering raises "profound issues concerning the legitimacy of our representational structures").

outcome. Realizing that their votes have been gerrymandered into near-meaninglessness, many Americans are checking out of the process entirely, as reflected by the lowest voter turnout in 2014 in any election since 1942.⁴³

When gerrymandering is used to establish safe districts, the proliferation of those safe seats leads to a more polarized and dysfunctional political climate. In safe districts, an incumbent's biggest threat is often a primary challenge from a more extreme member of his or her own party. This threat makes legislators reluctant to work across the aisle and support bipartisan legislation. Gerrymandering thus worsens "the hyper-partisanship that paralyzes our politics and governance."⁴⁴

Public trust in our democracy is further weakened by the lack of transparency in how redistricting is funded. The influx of dark money compounds this concern, replacing the will of the people with the will of anonymous special interests and wealthy donors. Dark money also increases the risk that politicians become beholden to the special interest groups funding redistricting efforts, rather than to their constituents. Recent surveys have shown that a significant majority of Americans believe "it doesn't matter if they vote," because politics and elections are controlled by

⁴³ Brian Klaas, *The Despot's Accomplice: How the West is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy* 184 (2016).

⁴⁴ Fred Dews, *A Primer on Gerrymandering and Political Polarization*, Brookings (July 6, 2017), <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/07/06/a-primer-on-gerrymandering-and-political-polarization/>.

wealthy interests.⁴⁵ This sentiment is bipartisan: “Democrats and Republicans generally agree that people like them, working people, the poor, and small businesses don’t have enough power in Washington, and that political lobbyists, Wall Street, large businesses, and the wealthy have too much influence.”⁴⁶ And not without reason: studies have found that “the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy.”⁴⁷

Americans are particularly troubled by how special interest groups are helping to gerrymander state and federal legislative districts. Across party lines, 64% of Americans believe that redistricting is a tactic to take power away from voters.⁴⁸ 71% of Americans believe that “those who stand to benefit from redrawing congressional districts should not have a say in

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Betsy Cooper, et al., PRRI, *The Divide Over America’s Future: 1950 or 2050? Findings From the 2016 American Values Survey* (Oct. 25, 2016), <https://www.prii.org/research/poll-1950s-2050-divided-nations-direction-post-election/>; *Views on Power and Influence in Washington*, Assoc. Press-NORC Ctr. for Pub. Affairs Research (2017), <http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/Power-and-Influence-in-Washington.aspx> [hereinafter AP-NORC Poll].

⁴⁶ AP-NORC Poll, *supra* note 45.

⁴⁷ See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, *Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens*, 12 *Perspectives on Politics*, no. 3, Sept. 2014, at 564, 575.

⁴⁸ *Americans Across Party Lines Oppose Common Gerrymandering Practices*, The Harris Poll (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.theharrispoll.com/politics/Americans_Across_Party_Lines_Oppose_Common_Gerrymandering_Practices.html.

how they are redrawn.”⁴⁹ One Wisconsin senator who voted for the redistricting plan at issue recently expressed remorse for his vote, explaining, “When you talk to people about our government, the thing they tell you is it’s rigged.”⁵⁰ Indeed, the process of redistricting merits little faith because drawing district lines is “among the most easily manipulated and least transparent systems in democratic governance.”⁵¹

Finally, Americans are not the only ones who have observed how partisan gerrymandering has undermined our political system. America’s democracy has long stood as a model to the world, a “city on a hill.”⁵² Partisan gerrymandering now threatens that role. A scholar of comparative politics recently remarked that “the American model is not the only viable one out there, and . . . other nations may not be insane to look at it with some sense of distaste.”⁵³ Rooted in part in our use of partisan gerrymandering, this view creates “knock-on effects that damage the core of democracy.”⁵⁴

That study of different democratic countries concluded that America’s extreme gerrymandering threatens the very fabric of our democracy and

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ Bazelon, *supra* note 2.

⁵¹ Dews, *supra* n. 44.

⁵² See Governor John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity (1630); President Ronald Reagan, A Vision for America, Election Eve Address (Nov. 3, 1980).

⁵³ Klaas, *supra* note 43, at 188.

⁵⁴ *Id.* at 183.

“mak[es] a mockery of the one person, one vote principle that is the granite ridge to which democracy should be anchored.”⁵⁵ We agree.

II. The Court Should Curb The Rise Of Partisan Gerrymandering By Affirming The District Court’s Decision.

When it comes to partisan gerrymandering, this Court can no longer remain on the sidelines. In *Reynolds v. Sims*, the Court explained that “[a]s long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.” 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). The Court should reaffirm this principle by holding that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable and that Wisconsin’s plan violates the Constitution.

The district court’s test—requiring evidence of discriminatory intent, a large and durable discriminatory effect, and a lack of a legitimate justification—provides a clear roadmap for lower courts, grounded in this Court’s precedents. The test addresses this Court’s prior concerns by articulating a clear standard that avoids sweeping in legitimate political conduct. The district court’s test is manageable, and, more importantly, will impose a needed threat of judicial accountability to constrain future partisan gerrymandering efforts.

⁵⁵ *Id.* at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The first element of the district court’s test—discriminatory intent—provides a workable standard that addresses the concerns expressed in *Vieth*. The district court required an intent “to place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of . . . votes . . . on the basis of . . . political affiliation.” Jurisdictional Statement App. 109a–110a. Unlike the proposed intent requirements addressed in *Vieth*, this test captures only those political classifications “applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.” *Id.* 84a (quoting 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The test is also a workable one, allowing courts to consider different forms of intent evidence including admissions, rejection of more neutral plans for no apparent reason, secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding the redistricting process, and unwillingness to include minority party voices. When politicians admit that their efforts to redraw district lines were intended to create undemocratic outcomes, courts should hold them accountable.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ A State ordinarily should find safe harbor against any allegation that it acted with discriminatory intent when it entrusts redistricting to an independent redistricting commission. *See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature*, 135 S. Ct. at 2652. As this Court recognized implicitly in *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973), safe harbors could also include districts designed by “a three-[person] bipartisan Board” rather than a single-party-controlled state legislature, or other processes that incorporate minority voices and promote public scrutiny and transparency through openness and publication of proposed and revised maps. When states take steps like these to protect redistricting from partisan influence, they ought rightly to insulate themselves from cries of foul play.

The second element—discriminatory effect—also addresses the concerns articulated in *Vieth*. The district court required a showing that the redistricting plan had the “effect” of diluting votes based on political affiliation. See Jurisdictional Statement App. 107a–110a. Unlike in prior cases, plaintiffs here focus on dilution of their votes due to their political affiliations, rather than on any claim to proportional representation. Cf. *Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting fairness principle based on a proportionality theory). The Court has recognized that “the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively . . . rank[s] among our most precious freedoms.” *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983). Vote dilution is a firmly rooted constitutional injury and provides a sound basis for the discriminatory effect test. And as Appellees demonstrate, experts can now readily measure the dilutive effects of partisan gerrymandering through election results, partisan bias, the “efficiency gap,” and sensitivity testing. These are exactly the sort of advancements Justice Kennedy envisioned when he spoke of “new technologies [that] may produce new methods of analysis that make more evident the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders impose.” *Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 312–13.

The final factor—lack of a legitimate justification—also speaks to *Vieth*’s concerns. This part of the test ensures that courts can distinguish between district maps drawn to achieve legitimate objectives and those based on impermissible partisan considerations. For example, this element will defeat claims where a

non-partisan explanation, such as geographical distribution of voters, accounts for the map's alleged discriminatory effect. Jurisdictional Statement App. 217a–218a. This element appropriately guarantees that legitimate legislative decisions will not be lumped in with naked retaliation based on party affiliation.

The Court should affirm the district court's test. But even if the Court concludes that the test has not adequately resolved the concerns expressed in *Vieth*, the Court should, at a minimum, hold that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable. As discussed above, the *Vieth* plurality's retreat from *Davis v. Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), has resulted in more frequent and extreme gerrymandering at the expense of our democracy. *See supra* Part I.

Moreover, the plurality's reasons for deeming partisan gerrymandering claims non-justiciable are unpersuasive. For example, the plurality relied in part on Congress's power to make or alter redistricting lines. *Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 275–77. But the Constitution leaves room for both Congress and the courts to remedy the problem of partisan gerrymandering. Nothing in Article I, Section 4 provides Congress with *exclusive* authority to modify congressional districts. And the question for courts is not what districts should look like, but whether partisan forces have manipulated the process to dilute votes based on political affiliation.

Even if the democratic process could prevent excess partisan gerrymandering in some cases, the Court must still step in where, as here, the democratic process has been used to violate citizens' fundamental

rights. See *League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC)*, 543 U.S. 399, 415 (2006) (Kennedy, J.) (“Our precedents recognize an important role for the courts when a districting plan violates the Constitution.”); *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (“[T]he Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, so long as that process does not abridge fundamental rights.”).

The *Vieth* plurality incorrectly suggested that Congress alone can solve the problem of partisan gerrymandering. The facts on the ground since *Vieth* demonstrate that the political process cannot provide an adequate solution. Judicial review is a necessary ingredient to restoring our democracy. This Court should hold that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable and that the Wisconsin redistricting plan is unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and those in Appellees’ brief, the Court should affirm the district court’s decision.

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